Evaluating Compromise in Social Choice Functions


  • Aleksandar Hatzivelkos University of Applied Sciences Velika Gorica
  • Marcel Maretic University of Zagreb, Faculty of Organization and Informatics




Social choice function, Social welfare function, Strict preferential voting, Compromise, Borda count, Plurality count, Divergence


We investigate the notion of compromise in the strict preferential voting setting. We introduce divergence as an inverse measure of compromise in a collection of strict preferential votes. Classical functions of social choice theory are analyzed with respect to divergence. New social welfare functions and new social choice functions with the objective of compromise are defined directly from optimization of divergence and later analyzed with respect to the common desiderata of social choice theory. For a very natural function, a simple divergence minimizer, we prove it satisfies the properties of anonymity, neutrality, consistence, and continuity. Consequently, according to Young’s theorem of characterization it follows that this function is a scoring point function. Its scoring point vector is also given. Finally, we discuss the parameter p in the divergence measure which was introduced to address vagueness and fuzziness of compromise and to control for a variety of intended levels of compromise.

Author Biography

Marcel Maretic, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Organization and Informatics

FOI, Dept. of quantitative methods




How to Cite

A. Hatzivelkos and M. Maretic, “Evaluating Compromise in Social Choice Functions”, J. inf. organ. sci. (Online), vol. 46, no. 2, Dec. 2022.